- Supplement to "What Model for Entry in First-Price Auctions? A Nonparametric Approach"
Marmer, Vadim, University of British Columbia - Economics, vmarmer@interchange.ubc.ca
Shneyerov, Art, Concordia University, achneero@alcor.concordia.ca
Xu, Pai, University of Hong Kong, paixu@hku.hk
The paper contains supplemental material for Marmer, Shneyerov, and Xu (2010) "What Model for Entry in First-Price Auctions? A Nonparametric Approach."
Creation Date: 2010-06-18 Revision Date: 2010-06-18
- Weak Identification in Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design
Lemieux, Thomas, University of British Columbia, tlemieux@interchange.ubc.ca
Marmer, Vadim, University of British Columbia - Economics, vmarmer@interchange.ubc.ca
We consider weak identification in the fuzzy regression discontinuity (FRD)
model. In this model, the treatment effect is identified through a
discontinuity in the conditional probability of treatment assignment. Weak
identification corresponds to the situation where the discontinuity is of a
small magnitude. When identification is weak, we show that the usual t-test based on the FRD estimator and its standard error suffers from
asymptotic size distortions. To eliminate those size distortions, we propose
a modified t-statistic that uses a null-restricted version of the standard
error of the FRD estimator. Simple and asymptotically valid confidence sets
for the treatment effect can be also constructed using the FRD estimator and its null-restricted standard error.
Creation Date: 2010-05-15 Revision Date: 2010-05-26
- A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms
Peters, Michael, University of British Columbia - Economics, peters@econ.ubc.ca
Troncoso-Valverde, Cristian, University of British Columbia,
We prove a folk theorem for games in which mechanism designers compete
in mechanisms and in which there are at least 4 players. All allocations
supportable by a centralized mechanism designer, including allocations
involving correlated actions (and correlated punishments) can be supported
as Bayesian equilibrium outcomes in the competing mechanism game.
Creation Date: 2010-05-13 Revision Date: 2010-06-10
- On the Revelation Principle and Reciprocal Mechanisms in Competing Mechanism
Games
Peters, Michael, University of British Columbia - Economics, peters@econ.ubc.ca
This paper provides a set of mechanisms that we refer to as emph{reciprocal
mechanisms. }These mechanisms have the property that every outcome
that can be supported as a Bayesian equilibrium in a competing mechanism
game can be supported as an equilibrium in reciprocal mechanisms. In this
sense, reciprocal mechanisms play the same role as direct mechanisms do
in single principal problems. The advantage of these mechanisms over
alternatives like the universal set of mechanisms
is that they are conceptually straightforward and no more difficult
to deal with than the simple direct mechanisms used in single principal
mechanism design.
Creation Date: 2010-05-13 Revision Date: 2010-05-13
- Supplement to "Quantile-Based Nonparametric Inference for First-Price Auctions"
Marmer, Vadim, University of British Columbia - Economics, vmarmer@interchange.ubc.ca
Shneyerov, Artyom, CIRANO, CIREQ, Concordia University, achneero@alcor.concordia.ca
This paper contains supplemental materials for Marmer and Shneyerov (2009) "Quantile-Based Nonparametric Inference for First-Price Auctions."
Creation Date: 2009-11-24 Revision Date: 2009-11-24
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