Theory Conference
CETC Conference Program
Tweet Official hashtag: #cetc2020
This is the official program for the 2020 Canadian Economic Theory Conference, organized by the University of British Columbia.
The general public (non-presenters) can register to attend here.
PRESENTERS: Please read instructions below for access details.
You can find detailed instructions for access and participation in the conference here.
We launched a Slack workspace for CETC2020! The idea is to use Slack as an imperfect substitute to regular "offline" conversations in a conference. You can obtain an invitation link at this Google form.
For those not familiar with Slack: it is a collaboration hub that can replace e-mail. Compared with e-mail or social networking platforms (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn), Slack is designed for professional communications. For example, it is easier to make a “channel” (a chat group for talking about a specific issue). Here is Slack’s official guide. Once you join the CETC slack, you can access through your browser and, preferrably, the Slack application.
All listed times are in Pacific Daylight Time zone (PDT).
Opening remarks: 6:50am - 7am
Session A: 7am - 9:40am
Moderator: Vitor Farinha Luz
- 7am-7:40am Optimal Project Design [Slide]
George Georgiadis* (Kellogg School of Management), Daniel F. Garrett (Toulouse School of Economics),
Alex Smolin (Toulouse School of Economics), Balázs Szentes (London School of Economics) - 7:40am - 8:20am Implementation via Transfers: Identical but Unknown Distributions [Slide]
Mariann Ollar* (University of Edinburgh), Antonio Penta (Pompeu Fabra University) - 8:20am - 9am Public Good Overprovision by a Manipulative Provider
Gorkem Celik* (ESSEC Business School and THEMA Research Center), Dongsoo Shin (Leavey School of Business),
Roland Strausz (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin) - 9am - 9:40am Learning Before Trading: On The Inefficiency of Ignoring Free Information [Slide]
Anne-Katrin Roesler (University of Toronto), Doron Ravid* (University of Chicago),
Balázs Szentes (London School of Economics)
Note: The presenter of "Learning Before Trading: On The Inefficiency of Ignoring Free Information." is changed to Doron Ravid (University of Chicago).
Break: 9:40am - 10am
Session B: 10am - 12pm
Moderator: Vitor Farinha Luz
- 10am - 10:40am Who wants to be an auctioneer? [Slide]
Gabor Virag* (University of Toronto), Sergei Severinov (University of British Columbia) - 10:40am - 11:20am Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement [Slide]
Hitoshi Matsushima (University of Tokyo), Shunya Noda* (University of British Columbia) - 11:20am - 12pm How to Sell in a Sequential Auction Market [Slide]
Ken Hendricks (University of Wisconsin-Madison), Thomas Wiseman* (University of Texas at Austin)
Note: "A Search Model of Statistical Discrimination" by Peter Norman is moved to Session B of May 9th.
Break: 12pm - 12:20pm
Session C: 12:20pm - 3pm
Moderator: Sergei Severinov
- 12:20pm - 1pm Imperfect Competition in Online Auctions with Sequential Entry
Alexander Maslov* (Kennesaw State University), Jesse A. Schwartz (Kennesaw State University) - 1pm - 1:40pm Designing and Pricing Certificates [Slide]
S. Nageeb Ali (Penn State University), Nima Haghpanah* (Penn State University),
Ron Siegel (Penn State University), Xiao Lin (Penn State University) - 1:40pm - 2:20pm Optimal Rating Design [Slide]
Ali Shourideh* (Carnegie Mellon University), Maryam Saeedi (Carnegie Mellon University) - 2:20pm - 3pm Persuasion with Unknown Beliefs
Svetlana Kosterina* (Princeton University)
Break: 3pm - 3:20pm
Session D: 3:20pm - 5:20pm
Moderator: Sergei Severinov
- 3:20pm - 4pm Repeated Communication with Private Lying Cost [Slide]
Harry Pei* (Northwestern University) - 4pm - 4:40pm Reputational Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law [Slide]
Hanzhe Zhang* (Michigan State University), Mehmet Ekmekci (Boston College) - 4:40pm - 5:20pm Label the Divorced: A Repeated-Game Analysis on (Re)Marriage Market
Yuk-fai Fong (The University of Hong Kong), Xiaoxiao Hu (Wuhan University), Xiaoxuan Meng (The University of Hong Kong), Yimeng Zhang* (The University of Hong Kong)
May 9th
All listed times are in Pacific Standard Time zone (PDT).
Session A: 7am - 9:40am
Moderator: Shunya Noda
- 7am - 7:40am Coordination on networks
Matthew Leister (Monash University), Yves Zenou (Monash University), Junjie Zhou* (National University of Singapore) - 7:40am - 8:20am Constrained Preference Elicitation
Yaron Azrieli* (The Ohio State University), Christopher Chambers (Georgetown University), Paul Healy (The Ohio State University) - 8:20am - 9am Viral Social Learning [Slide]
Yangbo Song* (Chinese University of Hong Kong), David McAdams (Fuqua School of Business) - 9am - 9:40am Information acquisition and time-risk preference
Weijie Zhong* (Yale University)
Break: 9:40am - 10am
Session B: 10am - 12pm
Moderator: Shunya Noda
- 10am - 10:40am Dynamic Privacy Choices [Slide]
Shota Ichihashi* (Bank of Canada) - 10:40am - 11:20am Voluntary Disclosure and Personalized Pricing
S. Nageeb Ali* (Penn State University), Gregory Lewis (Microsoft Research), Shoshana Vasserman (Stanford University) - 11:20am - 12pm A Search Model of Statistical Discrimination [Slide]
Peter Norman* (UNC Chapel Hill), Jiadong Gu (UNC Chapel Hill)
Note: "Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement" by Shunya Noda is moved to Session B of May 8th.
Break: 12pm - 12:20pm
Session C: 12:20pm - 3pm
Moderator: Michael Peters
- 12:20pm - 1pm Behavioral Neural Networks
Shaowei Ke* (University of Michigan), Chen Zhao (University of Hong Kong), Zhaoran Wang (Northwestern University), Sung-Lin Hsieh (University of Michigan) - 1pm - 1:40pm Rational Inattention and Perceptual Distance [Slide]
David Elliot Walker-Jones* (University of Toronto) - 1:40pm - 2:20pm Delegating Learning
Juan F Escobar (University of Chile), Qiaoxi Zhang* (University of Chile) - 2:20pm - 3pm Competing Pre-match Investments Revisited: A Characterization of Monotone Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Large Markets
Deniz Dizdar* (Université de Montréal)
Break: 3pm - 3:20pm
Session D: 3:20pm - 5:20pm
Moderator: Michael Peters
- 3:20pm - 4pm Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies
Takashi Kunimoto (Singapore Management University), Roberto Serrano* (Brown University) - 4pm - 4:40pm Persuading a Rationally Inattentive Agent
Alex Bloedel* (Stanford University), Ilya Segal (Stanford University) - 4:40pm - 5:20pm Electoral Maldistricting
Romans Pancs* (Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México), Tridib Sharma (Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México), Andrei Gomberg (Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México)
Symbol * indicates presenter.
Organizing committee (University of British Columbia):
- Vitor Farinha Luz
- Li, Hao
- Wei Li
- Shunya Noda
- Michael Peters
- Sergei Severinov
Tweet Official hashtag: #cetc2020